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I. INTRODUCTION
"If you've got a boss who is monitoring e-mail to see if people
are calling him a jerk-he probably is .... I
The relatively new technology of electronic mail (e-mail) presents
an entirely new issue of workplace privacy. Currently, whether a person
has a privacy interest in their workplace e-mail communications is as
unsettled an issue as it has been since the technology emerged in the
early part of this decade as the preferred mode of communication in the
workplace. Indeed, e-mail may soon be the preferred mode of commu-
nication in general.2
This comment will argue that all e-mail users have a privacy interest
in workplace e-mail communications and that the current law does not
afford e-mail users any type of protection for this interest. Part I will
address the rise of e-mail in the workplace and the privacy interest users
have in their workplace e-mail. Part II will discuss the law currently in
existence that has been applied to workplace e-mail privacy and how
this body of law has failed to recognize a privacy interest in workplace
e-mail messages. Part ll will discuss the few solutions that have been
proposed to deal with workplace e-mail privacy and how these fall far
short of protecting this important privacy interest. This comment will
then propose a structure of federal legislation to address this issue, con-
cluding that e-mail in the workplace should be a protected privacy
interest and that federal legislation is the only way in which to protect
this interest.
1. Abdon M. Pallasch, Company Policies to Monitor E-mail Licking Edge of Elec-
tronic Envelope, CHICAGO LAWYER, August 1995, at 4.
2. "[A]nother recent survey, according to a 1996 Dickinson Wright law firm newslet-
ter, estimates there will be 72 million employees using e-mail to send 4.1 trillion messages."
Kathleen Sibley, The E-mail Dilemma: To Spy or Not to Spy, COMPUTING CANADA, March
31, 1997 at 14. "E-mail is in use, in some capacity, in all Fortune 1000 companies, and it is
expected that by the year 2000, 40 million e-mail users will be sending 60 billion e-mail
messages a year." Steven Miller, E-mail's Popularity Poses Workplace Privacy Problems,
BusiNEss FIRST OF CoLuMMUs, Oct. 3, 1997, at 15. See also Hal Berghel, E-mail-The Good,
the Bad, and the Ugly, COAMMUNICATIONS OF THE ACM, April 1, 1997 at 11.
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II. E-MAIL AND PRIVACY
A. The Technology of E-mail and its Current Uses
E-mail is a powerful communications tool. Statistics abound about
the current use of e-mail in the business setting It has been reported
that in business settings e-mail is used more often than postal mail.4
While e-mail is now used most frequently in business settings, its use by
people for non-business conversation is only expected to increase and in
the future e-mail may be the preferred mode of communication for most
people.5 E-mail differs from other forms of office communication tech-
nology because of three factors: the ease of use of e-mail software, the
permanency of e-mail messages, and the ability to use e-mail as more
than just another communication device. These three new capabilities of
e-mail and the prevalence of e-mail are the reasons why the technology
of e-mail communication raises unique new issues of workplace pri-
vacy.
The use of e-mail in the workplace is obvious to most people. It al-
lows a user to type a message in a controlled manner and to review the
message prior to sending it.6 It also allows the receiver of the message to
read messages at his convenience. Furthermore, e-mail allows a user to
easily send the same message to many people at once, to forward mes-
sages to other people, or to reply to a message from another person.
Since a copy of the e-mail message is stored in the user's log, he can
access the message again for future reference. These are some of e-
mail's advantages over postal mail and telephone conversations.
However, most e-mail users do not recognize the permanency of e-
mail messages. E-mail servers store e-mail messages even after a user
has downloaded the message onto their personal computer. These mes-
sages stored on the server are then backed up in a more permanent way,
by being stored on magnetic tape. These back-ups are of the entire sys-
tem, not just the e-mail messages, and their primary purpose is to aid the
system operator in case the system crashes and must be restored. Most
3. "In the United States today there are close to 20 million electronic mail ("[e]-mail")
users .... It is projected that there will be more than 40 million [e]-mail users nationwide by
the year 2000 .... Today, 90 percent of all companies with more than 1,000 employees use
[el-mail." Anthony J. Dreyer, Note, When the Postman Beeps Twice: The Admissibility of
Electronic Mail Under the Business Records Exception of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 64
FORDHAMi L. REv. 2285, 2288 (1996).
4. See Arnie M. Soden, Protect Your Corporation from E-mail Litigation: Privacy,
Copyright Issues Should Be Addressed in Policy, CORPORATE LEGAL TIMES, May 1995, at
19; Dreyer, supra note 3, at 2288.
5. See Dreyer, supra note 3, at 2288.
6. See Berghel, supra note 2, at 11.
7. See id.
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organizations retain back-up tapes for several years and messages on
these tapes, even when overwritten with other data, can easily be ac-
cessed and searched to provide access to an entire e-mail message in its
original form.8 The legitimate purpose of back-up has lead to the per-
manence of e-mail and is the basis for most legal issues surrounding e-
mail.9
E-mail is a relatively new technology and its uses are still being de-
veloped and adapted for use in the workplace. E-mail is not just another
method of sending messages and communicating with other people.
While it is a way to send messages, it is also a way that information is
being digitized, collected, organized and manipulated. E-mail can be a
postage letter, a facsimile message, a telephone call, a filing cabinet, a
desk drawer, a voice mail system, a client file, a personnel file, or a per-
sonal organizer.'0 E-mail is more permanent than even a paper
document." E-mail is more accessible than a phone call or a desk. The
record created by e-mail is more precise than any communication re-
ceived through the postal system or from a facsimile machine. These are
the factors that make e-mail different and new, and an issue that must be
addressed by the law. 2
8. "[Mlainframe backups also make archiving and retrieving e-mail records much
easier than their paper counterparts." Dreyer, supra note 3, at 2291.
9. E-mail and its ramifications are in part a result of its permanence. This permanence
is a result of the need to backup information stored on computer systems. Issues such as
reading e-mail, evidentiary uses of e-mail, and the discovery of e-mail in litigation would not
exist were it not for the backing-up of computer systems. Discussing the application of the
rules of evidence to e-mail, see id. at 2299-2328. See also Betty Ann Olmstead, Electronic
Media: Management and Litigation Issues: When "Delete" Doesn't Mean Delete, 63 DEF.
CouNs. J. 523 (1996).
10. "In today's modem business setting, e-mail messages may include status reports,
inventory lists, minutes of meetings, drafts of documents, business strategies, or records of
important business decisions." Dreyer, supra note 3, at 2289.
11. "Unlike paper documents that can be discarded easily, 'purged' electronic docu-
ments may still exist in some sort of archival media where they can stay for an indefinite
period of time. Even when archived tapes are removed for reuse and the information has
been finally overwritten, such documents may still be recoverable." Olmstead, supra note 9,
at 526. See also Dreyer supra note 3, at 2291. "In actuality, most data can be restored unless
it has been overwritten.., and even overwritten documents can be deciphered." Marianne
Lavalle, Digital Information Boom Worries Corporate Counsel: Questions Arise About Data
Overload, Online Privacy, the Retrieval of Deleted E-mail and Technological Monopoly,
NAT'L L.J., May 30, 1994, at B1.
12. See John Araneo, Note, Pandora's (E-mail) Box: E-mail Monitoring in the Work-
place, 14 HoFsTRA LAB. L.J. 339, 356 (1996).
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B. Privacy and Workplace E-mail
1. Conceptions of Privacy
Privacy is a broad right and has been analyzed in many different
ways. While the right to privacy has many different aspects and has
been analyzed and developed in many different ways, this comment fo-
cuses upon the purpose of a privacy interest in workplace e-mail
communications and where this interest comes from. Privacy is not an
absolute concept, but one which is used to help individuals in society
define their community and the "boundaries of community life.' 3 De-
fining communities and the scope of personal conduct in these
communities is vital in today's society, because communities and other
types of boundaries are increasingly less well defined than they have
been in the past due to modem technology's erosion of the boundaries
set by the natural barriers of time and geography.
One commentator, Fred H. Cate, has stated that "privacy is a tool
needed to achieve some result. A society's interest in protecting privacy
reflects that society's interest in the result, not in privacy."'4 Robert C.
Post has argued that the tort of invasion of privacy "safeguards the in-
terests of individuals in the maintenance of rules of civility."'5 He
asserts that these rules of civility:
enable individuals to receive and to express respect, and to that
extent are constitutive of human dignity .... [T]hese rules also
enable individuals to receive and to express intimacy, and to
that extent are constitutive of human autonomy .... [T]he ci-
vility rules maintained by the tort embody the obligations owed
by members of a community to each other, and to that extent
define the substance and boundaries of community life.
6
This is where the invasion of privacy tort of intrusion comes into play
to provide people with a way, according to the terms of Post, "to receive
and to express respect."' 7 The interest protected is a recognition that per-
sonal autonomy must be afforded some measure of standing in the face of
the ability of other people in the workplace to access e-mail communica-
tions. In the terms of Cate, the result to be achieved for society is the
13. See FRED H. CATE, PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 31 (Brookings Institution
Press 1997); Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the
Common Law Tort, 77 CAL. L. REv. 957, 1008 (1989).
14. Cate, supra note 13, at 23.
15. Post, supra note 13, at 1008.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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protection of personal autonomy in communicating through e-mail and
this result equals the privacy interest. 8
Because there are more e-mail communications and these commu-
nications are permanent, not affording a privacy interest to e-mail users
in workplace communications means that the user has no way to estab-
lish boundaries and then no way to determine what obligations are owed
to all members of the workplace community. As Alan Westin has stated:
Each individual must, within the larger context of his culture,
his status, and his personal situation, make a continuous adjust-
ment between his needs for solitude and companionship; for
intimacy and general social intercourse; for anonymity and re-
sponsible participation in society; for reserve and disclosure.' 9
2. Privacy in the Workplace
Conceptions of the privacy interest of workplace e-mail aside,
"private employees have diminished expectations of personal privacy in
the modem workplace. ' 2° One commentator has summarized employee
workplace privacy as follows: "[t]raditionally, employees have received
little privacy protection on the job."'" While privacy rights for employ-
ees can be found in federal and state constitutions, "It]he basic legal
bulwark for private sector employee privacy protection is the common
law of torts, most often through the tort of invasion of privacy."
Prosser listed the elements of the intrusion kind of the invasion of
privacy tort as "the intrusion must be something which would be offen-
sive or objectionable to a reasonable man .... [The thing into which
there is prying or intrusion must be, and be entitled to be, private." z The
Restatement of Torts includes a more modem summarization of these
factors: "one who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon
the solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is
18. "Privacy is an essential component of individual autonomy and dignity. Our sense
of liberty is partly defined by the ability to control our own lives-whether this be the kind
of work we undertake, who we choose to associate with, where we live, the kind of religious
and political beliefs we hold, or the information we wish to divulge about ourselves." Gary
T. Marx & Sanford Sherizen, Monitoring on the Job: How to Protect Privacy as Well as
Property, TECH. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1986, at 63, 65.
19. ALAN F. WESTIN, PIVACY AND FREEDOM 42 (1967).
20. John C. Barker, Note, Constitutional Privacy Rights in the Private Workplace, Un-
der The Federal and California Constitutions, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 1107, 1108 (1992).
21. Steven Winters, Comment, The New Privacy Interest: Electronic Mail in the Work-
place, 8 HIGH TECH. L.J. 197, 201 (1993).
22. Frank J. Cavico, Invasion of Privacy in the Private Employment Sector: Tortious
and Ethical Aspects, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1263, 1266 (1993).
23. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 391 (1960).
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subject to liability to the other for invasion of... privacy, if the intru-
sion would be highly offensive to a reasonable person."24
In terms of how the tort of invasion of privacy should be applied to
cases of e-mail monitoring, one commentator has formulated the ques-
tion as "whether computer technology has so shifted control to the
employer that the scales need to be re-calibrated to better protect an
employee's privacy rights."' Another primary question that needs to be
answered is "whether the employee has a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in employer-provided computers and e-mail services." 26 There is
little debate about the actual questions involved. The debate centers
around where to draw the line; or to use the query of Post, how the
community of the individual workplace is going to "define the sub-
stance and boundaries of community life" and to then clarify "the
obligations owed by members of a community to each other.
27
The traditional view of the issue of workplace privacy, is where the
employer's rights begin and the employee's interest in privacy ends. As
one commentator has noted, "ilt is argued that employers' interests
should be favored because the work is done on the employers' premises.
Employers own the communications equipment used at work and it is
the company's business which is being conducted on this equipment.
' '
However, a broader approach might be more appropriate. With e-mail
and the interest in personal privacy, a tension exists not only between
employer and employee, but also between the user and the people with
the capability to access the e-mail system. By narrowing the issue to
focus solely upon the construct of the employer and employee relation-
ship, the broader question of whether individual users have a privacy
interest in their e-mail is ignored.
The privacy interest to be protected, originally identified by Warren
and Brandeis, was one belonging to individuals.29 The technology of e-
mall attacks this idea of individual privacy, because e-mail does not just
belong to individuals. The e-mail messages of all users can be accessed
whether that person is a secretary or the Chief Executive Officer. Com-
puter technologies are equalizers; they destroy previous forms of
authority by treating all users equally. For this reason all users' privacy
interests must be analyzed as a whole and not based upon titles of
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
25. See Winters, supra note 21, at 202.
26. Brian D. Pedrow & Debra E. Kohn., Tampering with E-mail: Proprietary Rights and
Privacy Issues, 21 LAw PRAc. MGMT., Nov.-Dec. 1995 at 36, 38.
27. Post, supra note 13, at 1008.
28. See Winters, supra note 21, at 201.
29. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REv.
193, 193 (1890).
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authority. E-mail creates a larger community for users beyond that of
the workplace and in this larger community are the values that the pri-
30vacy interest protects.
H. THE LAW
A. Electronic Communications Privacy Act
The only federal law currently applicable to the issue of workplace
e-mail monitoring is the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of
1986 (ECPA).3 This Act provides a framework for the discussion of the
issue of privacy rights in workplace e-mail. Many of the Act's provi-
sions that apply to workplace e-mail privacy issues remain untested, but
some case law has emerged interpreting the applicability of some provi-
sions of the Act. These cases demonstrate how courts may be inclined to
apply the ECPA to cases of workplace e-mail privacy, in addition to
demonstrating the inherent weaknesses of the ECPA in providing users
of workplace e-mail systems with any type of privacy protections.
The ECPA is an amendment to Title III of the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, also known as the Federal Wire-
tap Law." The 1986 amendment to the statute was to "update and clarify
Federal privacy protections and standards in light of dramatic changes
in new computer and telecommunications technologies."33 The Act
among other things, provided a federal definition of e-mail and other
"new" communication technologies, and brought these technologies into
the previous wiretap law of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968?' The primary components of the Act are Title I, which ad-
30. "[M]onitoring could become much more extensive in society at large. Practices de-
veloped at work can easily spill over into other areas." Marx, supra note 18, at 70.
31. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2711 (1998).
32. See S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555; U.S.C.
§ 2510 (1998).
33. S. REP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555.
34. The Act defined e-mail as:
Electronic mail is a form of communication by which private correspondence is trans-
mitted over public and private telephone lines. In its most common form, messages are typed
into a computer terminal, and then transmitted over telephone lines to a recipient computer
operated by an electronic mail company. If the intended addressee subscribes to the service,
the message is stored by the company's computer "mail box" until the subscriber calls the
company to retrieve its mail, which is then routed over the telephone system to the recipi-
ent's computer. If the addressee is not a subscriber to the service, the electronic mail
company can put the message onto paper and then deposit it in the normal postal system.
Electronic mail systems may be available for public use or may be proprietary, such as sys-
tems operated by private companies for internal correspondence.
S. Rm,. No. 99-541, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3562.
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dresses the interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications
and Title II, which addresses access to stored communications.3"
Before the enactment of the Act, studies were done to underscore
the need for the Act.36 One such study was the Office of Technology
Assessment's report entitled "Electronic Surveillance and Civil Liber-
ties," which concluded that "current legal protections for electronic mail
are 'weak, ambiguous, or non-existent,' and that 'electronic mail re-
mains legally as well as technically vulnerable to unauthorized
surveillance."' 3 7 Concerning the need for the Act, the Senate commit-
tee's report stated:
A letter sent by first class mail is afforded a high level of pro-
tection against unauthorized opening by a combination of
constitutional provisions, case law, and U.S. Postal Service
statutes and regulations .... But there are no comparable Fed-
eral statutory provisions to protect the privacy and security of
communications transmitted by new noncommon carrier com-
munications services or new forms of telecommunications and
computer technology.38
The Senate report further stated: "This gap [between postal privacy
protections and new technology protections] results in legal uncertainty
.... It may also discourage American businesses from developing new
innovative forms of telecommunications and computer technology."39
Although Congress's intention was to resolve the "legal uncer-
tainty" through the enactment of the ECPA, it remains unclear whether
this has happened. One commentator has stated that the ECPA "does not
complete the work required to be done to provide adequate assurances
of electronic privacy, 4 because:
[The Act] creates a legal framework that substantially con-
strains access by government agents to all forms of electronic
communications clearly and reasonably intended to be kept pri-
vate. But the Act does not complete the work required to be
done to provide adequate assurance of electronic privacy. Those
who provide electronic communications services ... must make
35. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522, 2711
36. S. REP. No. 99-541, at4 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3558.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3559.
39. Id.
40. David Johnson, Privacy: Good Sysops Should Build Good Fences (visited Apr. 13,
1998) <http:llwwvw.eff.orgpubPrivacy/goodfences-johnson.article>.
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clear which types of messages are to be kept strictly private and
which are meant to be freely shared... .
To date, the ECPA primarily has been raised in cases of phone in-
terception and has yet to be raised in a case involving workplace e-mail
monitoring.42 A recent case involving e-mail to raise an ECPA claim
was Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Service.43 In
Steve Jackson, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals provided a useful in-
terpretation of the two provisions of the ECPA and their relation to
accessing e-mail communications.' The district court in Steve Jackson,
held that Title I of the ECPA had not been violated by the Secret Serv-
ice's actions because "[the] acquisition of the contents of the electronic
communications was not contemporaneous with the transmission of
those communications.,,4' The court of appeals in affirnming the district
court's action, discussed at length the difference between the require-
ments of Title I and Title ]1.46 The court concluded that the Secret
Service agents' actions were not an "interception" for the purpose of
Title I of the statute, but instead were an accessing of stored communi-
cations under Title II. The court noted the difference between the
procedural safeguards in standards of Title I and II was because:
Interception thus poses a significant risk that officers will obtain
access to communications which have no relevance to the in-
vestigation they are conducting. That risk is presented to a
lesser degree, and can be controlled more easily, in the context
of stored electronic communications, because, as the Secret
Service advised the district court, technology exists by which
relevant communications can be located without the necessity
41. Id.
42. See Frank C. Morris, Issues from the Electronic Workplace E-mail Communica-
tions: The Developing Employment Law Nightmare, SB07 ALI-ABA 335, 341 (1996). See,
e.g., Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153 (8th Cir. 1992) (finding a violation of the ECPA for tap-
ing an employee's phone conversations without obtaining her consent); Watkins v. L.M.
Berry & Company, 704 F.2d 577 (11th Cir. 1983) (finding that there was a material issue of
fact about whether an employee had consented to the employer monitoring the employee's
phone calls). However, states have enacted statutes which mirror the ECPA and claims have
been raised pursuant to those statutes without success, see discussion infra Part II.C.
43. Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (3d Cir. 1996)
(Steve Jackson dealt with the accessing of e-mail messages by the Secret Service on a server
that had been seized as part of a raid on a computer bulletin board operator. The plaintiffs
were operators of and users of the server which was used for e-mail communications and an
electronic bulletin board. Many of the users' e-mail in question had not been read by the
users prior to the server's seizure by the Secret Service. The court of appeals affirmed the
trial court's holding that Title Il of the ECPA had been violated, but not Title I.).
44. Id. at 460-64.
45. Id. at 459-60.
46. Id. at 461-64.
Workplace E-Mail: The New Privacy Frontier
of reviewing the entire contents of all of the stored communica-
tions.47
In conclusion, the court stated, "that Congress intended to treat wire
communications differently from electronic communications. Access to
stored electronic communications may be obtained pursuant to a search
warrant, 18 U.S.C. § 2703; but, access to stored wire communications
requires a court order pursuant to § 2518.' m The appeals court found
that the Secret Service had violated the provisions of Title II and
awarded the plaintiffs damages. 9
Steve Jackson dealt with the accessing of e-mail by the Secret
Service for the purposes of a law enforcement investigation." However,
the case demonstrates the difference between the interpretation of an
"interception" and a "stored communication" under the ECPA. Because
e-mail messages are routed through a server where they are saved, in
terms of applying the ECPA to the accessing of e-mail messages Title II
will come into play and not Title I
Title II provides several exceptions to the ECPA's prohibition
against accessing electronic communications. 2 The two most important
sections for the purpose of workplace e-mail are what have been termed
the "business-extension," "business use," or "ordinary course of busi-
ness" exception (18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1)) and the "consent" exception
(18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2)). 3 While these exceptions exist as part of the
law, their parameters have not been tested through cases involving the
accessing of stored communications; therefore, most cases defining the
scope of the ECPA's exceptions have arisen under Title I.
47. Id. at 463.
48. Id. at 464. See discussion infra pp. 11-15 (for a discussion about the importance of
the court's distinction in Steve Jackson Games that the accessing of an e-mail communica-
tion should be analyzed under the prohibitions of Title II of the ECPA not Title I).
49. Id. at 464.
50. See id. at 463.
51. Because of the way most computer systems are configured, it is not likely that an e-
mail message can be intercepted, prior to its passing through a server, so as to invoke Title I
of the ECPA. See, e.g., U.S. v. Moriarty, 962 F. Supp. 217 (D. Mass. 1997) (holding that
interception of electronic communications only applies to accessing information while in
transmission).
52. See 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c) (1998).
53. Larry 0. Natt Gantt, II, An Affront to Human Dignity: Electronic Mail Monitoring in
the Private Sector Workplace, 8 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 345, 364 (1995). One commentator has
differentiated the business use exception from a separate service provider exception. This
was done because his analysis focused upon the telephone interception cases and then the
application of those cases to the issue of e-mail service providers. For the purposes of this
comment, based upon 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c), there is only one exception, the business use
exception. But see Jarrod J. white, E-Mail@ Work.Com: Employer Monitoring of Employee
E-Mail, 48 ALA. L. REv. 1079,1086-90 (1997).
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The consent exception is more straight forward, because it provides
that access is allowed when given "with respect to conduct authorized
... (2) by a user of that service with respect to a communication of or
intended for that user.'' 4 Commentators have summarized this exception
as: "The most certain protection against liability under the ECPA exists
when express consent has been given by an employee prior to any inter-
ception or access of E-mail in electronic storage. ' 55 One commentator
stated that this consent "may be expressly given, and in some cases rea-
sonably implied from the surrounding situation."56 The basis for
analyzing a person's consent to monitoring has often been analogized to
the telephone monitoring cases, which normally involve the interception
of communications.57 However, from these cases it is not clear whether
consent for the purposes of intercepting a communication must be ex-
press to that interception or can be implied58 In the voice messaging
system case of Bohach v. City of Reno, the court found that the consent
exception of Title II of the ECPA includes a person's implied consent to
the accessing of messages, when it is known by him that messages in
the system can be accessed by other parties prior to using the system.59
While courts have not clearly developed the basis of the consent ex-
ception, the parameters of the "business use" exception may be even
more difficult to clarify for the purposes of accessing e-mail under Title
II of the ECPA. The exception is stated as "with respect to conduct
authorized-(1) by the person or entity providing a wire or electronic
communications service."' For the purposes of e-mail, § 2701(c)(1) is
especially vague because an e-mail service provider can be either the
firm providing a user with service, or a firm providing a user access to a
service provided by another company. Today e-mail services can be
provided to firms by e-mail service providers, providers of telecommu-
nication services generally, or the firm may have its own server. In each
of these cases based upon the language of the statute, it is not clear how
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(2).
55. See White supra note 53, at 1083-84; see also Anne L. Lehman, E-Mail in the
Workplace: Question of Privacy, Property or Principle?, 5 Coml. LAw CONSPECTUS 99, 103
(1997) stating: "[I]f a company that supplies e-mail service to its employees is seen as a
service provider, simple authorization from the company is required to access the stored
messages received and sent by its employees."
56. Sally D. Garr, Employee Monitoring and Privacy in the Internet Age, SB53 ALI-
ABA 1, 11 (1997) (citing Deal v. Spears, 980 F.2d 1153, 1158 (8th Cir. 1992)).
57. See id. at 9; White, supra note 53, at 1083-85; Gantt, supra note 53, at 356; David
Neil King, Note, Privacy Issues in the Private-Sector Workplace: Protection from Electronic
Surveillance and the Emerging "Privacy Gap", 67 S. CAL. L. Rav. 441,451-54 (1994).
58. See Spears, 980 F.2d 1153; Watkins, 704 F.2d 577.
59. Bohach v. City of Reno, 932 F. Supp. 1232, 1236 (D. Nev. 1996).
60. 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1) (1998).
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the ECPA's exception applies. If the exception can be applied, it essen-
tially gives the "provider" unlimited access to the contents of stored
communications." One commentator has summarized § 2701(c)(1)'s
exception as:
Courts have interpreted this provision [Title I's similar
"business use" exception] to exclude from the law's prohibi-
tions interceptions by an employer of employee
communications, provided such interceptions have occurred in
the ordinary course of the employer's business. Though none of
these cases has involved e-mail, their analysis of the business
exception can be applied to e-mail.62
Since that was written, there still have not been any workplace e-
mail cases addressing this issue; however, the Bohach case did address
the provider exemption issue.63 Additionally, the court in Andersen Con-
sulting LLP v. UOP, addressed an aspect of the provider exception. 
6
While these cases do not definitively answer the question of who is a
provider for the purposes of workplace e-mail, they shed light on how
courts are inclined to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 2701(c)(1).
In Bohach, the court found that the City of Reno, for the purposes of
the ECPA, was a provider of the communications service, a computer-
ized internal voice messaging system and was therefore "free to access
the stored messages as it pleased." 5 The court's reasoning for finding no
ECPA access violation, was that "§ 2701(c)(1) allows service providers
to do as they wish when it comes to accessing communications in elec-
tronic storage."'' This statement is the extent of the court's
consideration about whether the city was a service provider of the
communications services for the purpose of an ECPA access violation.67
Reaching its final conclusion that the city would not violate the ECPA
in accessing the voice messaging communications of two police officers
under investigation, the court stated: "Because the City is the provider
of the 'service,' neither it nor its employees can be liable under
§ 2701. '
61. See Ruel Torres Hernandez, ECPA and Online Computer Privacy, 41 FED. CoMIe.
L.J. 17, 39-41 (1988); see also Pedrow, supra note 26, at 37.
62. Pedrow, supra note 26, at 37.
63. See Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1235-36.
64. Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp 1041, 1042 (N.D. IlM. 1998).
65. Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1237.
66. Id. at 1236.
67. See discussion infra pp. 14-15 (discussing that once there is a finding that a firm is
a service provider of the communications service, under the exception of § 2701(c)(1) the
firm is at liberty to access all stored communications of that service).
68. Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236.
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In Andersen, the court found that the ECPA had not been violated
by UOP"9 when it disclosed e-mail messages from Andersen employees
to the Wall Street Journal. The Andersen employees had been working
for UOP as contractors, and had been using UOP's e-mail system in the
course of their contract work for UOP.70 UOP, unhappy with Andersen's
work, released the Andersen employees' e-mail messages, stored on the
UOP computer system, to the Wall Street Journal for their publication in
a story about the breach of contract action brought by UOP against An-
dersen . ' Andersen filed a separate action against UOP alleging a
violation of the ECPA through the release of the e-mail messages." An-
dersen argued that as a contractor they were allowed to access UOP's
system causing UOP to be a public service provider, therefore UOP's
accessing and release of the e-mail messages was in violation of the
ECPA pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2702. The court in dismissing the ac-
tion, found that UOP was not a public service provider under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2702(a)(1), but only provided services to its employees which in-
cluded the Andersen employees while they were contracting with
UoP.
74
The Andersen case was brought under the theory that UOP was a
public service provider of e-mail services for the purpose of the ECPA.75
The significance of the Andersen case is the court's statement that UOP
was a service provider. While the case does not provide an analysis of
Andersen's claim under § 2701's exceptions, the outcome of the case
assumes that because Andersen was a service provider, but not a pro-
vider for the purposes of § 2702, § 2701 was not violated by UOP's
release of the Andersen employee's e-mail messages to the Wall Street
Journal. This result is consistent with the court's statement in Bohach
that "[b]ecause the City is the provider of the 'service,' neither it nor its
employees can be liable under § 2701."76
69. UOP is "a joint venture of Allied Signal Inc. and Union Carbide Corp .. ", Eliza-
beth MacDonald, Workplace: E-Mail Trail Could Haunt Consultant in Court, WALL ST. J.,
June 19, 1997, atB1.
70. See Andersen, 991 F. Supp. at 1041; see also MacDonald, supra note 69, at BI (the
story that caused the allegation of the ECPA violations).
71. See Andersen, 991 F. Supp. at 1041. It is not difficult to understand Andersen's out-
rage at UOP for the disclosure of the e-mail messages for publication in the newspaper.
Among other things contained in the messages, "consultants sent disparaging messages
about each other. 'It's horrible,' one Andersen consultant wrote about a colleague. 'He has
his hot, sweaty face just inches from yours, like some kind of putrid pumpkin."' MacDonald,
supra note 69, at BI.
72. See Andersen, 991 F. Supp. at 1041, 1042.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236.
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Older cases brought under the ECPA, usually involving the inter-
ception of telephone calls, raised distinctions that the "business use"
exception of the ECPA applied only when "the employer had a legiti-
mate business purpose to justify the interception of the employee's
communication." 77 However, it is not clear that such a distinction must
be made for e-mail communications accessed under § 2701. Under
§ 2701, the employer would only have to show that the firm is a pro-
vider. This showing would require a firm to show how e-mail services
are provided to the e-mail users of the firm.
Congress's intent as to who is to be considered a service provider is
not clear. 71 Whether Congress only intended § 2701's exceptions to ap-
ply to public, commercial providers, such as CompuServe, when they
provide e-mail services to other companies if it was to apply to firms
when they provide e-mail services to their employees through their own
servers remains unclear." Section 2702 clearly states that public service
providers have a "business use" exception to access e-mail messages
when they provide e-mail services to the public at large.80 However,
whether e-mail services provided by a firm to users, gives the firm an
exception to access a user's e-mail messages is not clear.8' The recent
cases of Bohach and Andersen demonstrate that courts are inclined to
interpret this gray area to mean that for the purposes of § 2701, firms
providing e-mail services to their employees are exempted from
§ 2701's prohibitions against accessing stored e-mail communications
under § 2701(c)'s exceptions.82
B. Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act
Because the ECPA has not been directly applied to the issue of ac-
cessing workplace e-mail communications, and also because the current
77. Kevin J. Baum, Comment, E-mail in the Workplace and the Right of Privacy, 42
VILL. L. REv. 1011, 1026 (1997).
78. See White, supra note 53, at 1089; David R. Johnson, Privacy: Good Sysops
Should Build Good Fences, (visited Apr. 13, 1998) <http://www.eff.orglpublPrivacyl
good-fences-johnson.article>, "Those who provide electronic communications serv-
ices-a category that will increasingly include most large companies ...."
79. See White, supra note 53, at 1089.
80. See 18 U.S.C. § 2702 (1998).
81. "Depending upon how the term 'entity providing an electronic communications
service' is construed, employers who provide the electronic communications service that
their employees use, may have unfettered right to access stored employee communications.
The case law in this area is very sparse and so unclear that even legal commentators are in
dispute." Garr, supra note 56, at 9.
82. See discussion infra Part I.D.3.a (discussing the unreported case of Shoars v. Epson
America, Inc., a case preceding Bohach, where the court supported this interpretation of
§ 2701(c)(1)'s exceptions).
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ECPA case law renders an interpretation of the Act that provides mini-
mal restraint on a firm's accessing of users' e-mail communications and
a minimal recognition of users' privacy interest in e-mail communica-
tions, questions remain about how, when and for what purposes
workplace e-mail communications may and should be accessed. These
issues have in part spawned additional congressional efforts to address
the issue of electronic workplace monitoring of employees. The most
pronounced of these was the Privacy for Consumers and Workers Act
(PCWA) originally introduced into Congress in 1991.83 Similar legisla-
tion was introduced in 1992 and 1993. 4 None of this legislation has
been enacted into law.
The legislation that has thus far been introduced has followed a con-
sistent pattern and is illustrative to show how Congress has framed
solutions to some of the problems posed by the ECPA and more gener-
ally to the issue of employee electronic monitoring. The approach of the
PCWA is to look generally at the issue of employee electronic moni-
toring of which e-mail monitoring is but one component. The
introduction of H.R. 1218, the first PCWA legislation, states the pur-
pose of the legislation is "to protect employees from burdensome secret
electronic monitoring in the workplace by providing employees with
notice when they are being monitored electronically while performing
their jobs."85 Workplace e-mail, one area where electronic monitoring
occurs, was discussed as needing protection because: "[e]lectronic mail
interception exposes employee's electronic mail messages to their em-
ployer's scrutiny. As computers are increasingly linked together locally,
nationally, and internationally, employers and others can more easily
penetrate and abuse corporate computer systems and information."'8 6
One commentator summarized the provisions of the PCWA, in the
context of e-mail monitoring, as follows:
[T]he law would allow employers to monitor employee's e-mail
and, to some extent, use the information collected against em-
ployees. Before doing so, however, employers would be
required to inform employees that their communications are
subject to monitoring and also to inform them of the form and
scope of the monitoring and use to be made of the data col-
lected.' 7
83. See H.R. RFP. No. 102-1024, at 1 (1992), reprinted in 1992 WL 316386.
84. See S. 984, 103d Cong. (1993).
85. H.R. REP. No. 102-1024, at 8 (1992), reprinted in 1992 WL 316386.
86. H.R. REP. No. 102-1024, at 13 (1992), reprinted in 1992 WL 316386.
87. Pedrow, supra note 26, at 38.
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The thrust of the PCWA is to provide a structure for employer elec-
tronic monitoring to take place over some employees while providing
those employees with procedural safeguards in which the monitoring
must take place. Because the PCWA is designed to cover all aspects of
electronic monitoring, some issues discrete to e-mail, but not raised by
other forms of electronic monitoring are not thoroughly addressed."
One commentator discussing the PCWA has stated:
[The PCWA] is certainly a major step toward adequate privacy
protection for the employee in the private-sector workplace ....
However, the passage of the PCWA would still leave employees
subject to offensive non-electronic monitoring, and falls to
protect the employee against egregious privacy violations that
meet the notice requirements of the Act."
Some commentators have criticized the PCWA for being too pro-
employee while others have stated that the PCWA does not go far
enough in protecting employee interests." Still others have praised the
PCWA for even attempting to address the issue. The PCWA, however,
is not law. It is a recognition by some members of Congress that there is
a problem regarding employee privacy. More so, it is an indication of
the way Congress may frame the issue of employee monitoring in the
future and of the type of solution that Congress sees for the problems
raised by employee monitoring. There are better ways to frame the issue
of employer monitoring of e-mail and better solutions to the problem
than what have been proposed in the PCWA.
C. Electronic Mail Cases
There have been few reported cases addressing the monitoring of
workplace e-mail.9' The only reported cases to address the issue are
88. See, e.g., Laurie Thomas Lee, Watch Your E-mail! Employee E-mail Monitoring and
Privacy Law in the Age of the "Electronic Sweatshop", 28 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 139, 167-
68 (1994) (noting that the proposed law would not address the issue of how the PCWA's
protections and policies would be affected by the ECPA); see also Araneo, supra note 12, at
356. The author notes that e-mail should not be compared directly with telephone or postal
communications in addressing employer monitoring because "[e]-mail has its own identity
and character, and ultimately it brings to the table new problems of employee privacy and
employer monitoring." Id.
89. King, supra note 57, at 473.
90. Compare id. with Gantt, supra note 53, at 410.
91. There have been several cases where e-mail has been a factor in the case, but these
cases have not dealt with the central issue of who does, can and should have access to user's
e-mail messages. See Lian v. Sedgwick James of New York, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 5129(DC),
1998 WL 30284, at *1 (S.D. N.Y. Jan 28, 1998) (employment defamation suit brought by an
employee based upon an e-mail message sent by the employer to other employees about the
terms of the former employee's termination); Owens v. Morgan Stanley & Co., No. 96 CIV.
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Restuccia v. Burk Technology, and Smyth v. Pillsbury Company.92 There
are several other unreported cases that address this issue, all of which
arose in California state courts.93 All of the cases, reported and unre-
ported, to address e-mail monitoring in the workplace have been based
upon state law claims and none of them have raised claims pursuant to
the ECPA. Some of these cases have raised issues under state statutes
which mirror the ECPA, but it is not clear why ECPA claims were not
raised in any of these cases.
Looking at these cases is instructive because they demonstrate the
type of recognition that state courts have given to e-mail users' claims
in response to the accessing of their e-mail communications. These
cases also demonstrate how e-mail users have framed their claims and
the lack of success that most have faced in raising a claim against im-
proper access of their e-mail communications. Most importantly, these
cases demonstrate that state law may provide some recognition, at least
more recognition than the ECPA currently provides, that e-mail users
have a protected privacy interest in their e-mail communications. Nev-
ertheless in most cases, this recognition is still tenuous.
1. Restuccia v. Burk Technology
Restuccia and LoRoe were employed at Burk Technology where
they used the office e-mail system.94 Mr. Burk, the president of Burk,
9747(DLC), 1997 WL 793004, at *1 (S.D. N.Y. Dec. 24, 1997) (employment discrimination
claim by an employee stemming from racist e-mail messages.); Donley v. Ameritech Serv-
ices, Inc., No. 92-72236, 1992 WL 678509, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 1992) (wrongful
termination suit brought by an employee for sending an inappropriate e-mail message about
a client).
92. Restuccia v. Burk Technology, Inc. 5 Mass L. Rptr. No. 31, 712 (November 4,
1996); Smyth v. Pillsbury Company, 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Penn 1996).
93. Bourke v. Nissan Motor, Co., No. YC 003979 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb, 1, 1991) (a
copy of the appellate decision of July 26, 1993 can be found online at
<http:www.law.seattleu.edu/chonm/Cases/bourke.html.>, (visited Apr. 13, 1998); the appel-
late court affirmed the trial court's decision); Flanagan v. Epson America, Inc., No. BC
007036 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 31, 1990); Shoars v. Epson, America, Inc., No. SWC
112749 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 26, 1990). While it has not been reported, there was a
civil suit filed in the case of Eugene Wang leaving Borland for Symantech by Wang against
his former firm, Borland, for Borland's review of his e-mail messages immediately after he
announced his resignation from Borland to join Symantech. See John Burgess, Criminal
Probe Launched Over Trade Secrets: Software Firms Charges Executive Took Information,
WASH. PosT, Sept. 8, 1992, at El; John Thackray, The E-mail is Deadlier.. .- Electronic
Mail Has Added a Bizarre New Dimension to US Office Politics, THE OBSERVER, May 1,
1994, at 8. A criminal case was brought against Wang and Borland for misappropriation of
trade secrets. The criminal case raised a unique issue of conflict of interest because Borland
provided financial assistance to the district attorney's office in investigating the computer
system of Borland. See People v. Eubanks, 927 P.2d 310, 312-14 (Cal. 1997).
94. See Restuccia, 5 Mass L. Rptr. No. 31, at 712.
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fired Restuccia and LoRoe after accessing the company's e-mail system
and reviewing their e-mail messages discovering that they referred to
him by various nicknames and knew about his extra-marital affair. "
Mr. Burk reviewed e-mail messages stored in the company system for
eight hours after a staff meeting where LoRoe had protested new office
policies and another employee told Burk about LoRoe's e-mail use.96
Mr. Burk stated that he fired LoRoe and Restuccia for their excessive e-
mail use-not the content of their messages."
To use the Burk e-mail system, a user had to log on with a person-
ally selected password.9" The firm had no policy about e-mail use other
than that "excessive chatting" should not take place.99 Restuccia and
LoRoe were not told and did not know that their supervisors could gain
access to their e-mail messages." After their termination, they brought
a suit against Burk Technology for wrongful termination, invasion of
privacy, unlawful interception of wire communications, intentional and
negligent infliction of emotional distress, loss of consortium and inter-
ference with contractual relations."1 Burk moved for summary judgment
on all claims, which was granted except for the claims of wrongful ter-
mination, invasion of privacy, negligent infliction of emotional distress
and loss of consortium.' °2
Restuccia and LoRoe failed on their claim of unlawful interception
of wire communication, brought pursuant to the Massachusetts statute
G.L.C. 272, § 99.13 This statute prohibits the "secret hearing or secret
recording of wire communications by means of an intercepting de-
vice."" 4 The statute also provided for what is called a "business use
exception" to the interception prohibitions.0 5 The court read the statute
to exempt the actions of Burk in accessing the stored e-mail messages."'
The court found that Restuccia and LoRoe had raised an issue which
presented a question of fact as to whether Burk's review of their e-mail
messages was an invasion of privacy and grounds for wrongful termi-
nation.0 7 The court found that there was a question of fact as to whether
95. See id.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See id.
99. See id.
100. See id.
101. See id.
102. See id.
103. See id. at 713.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. See id.; see discussion supra p. 11 (about the ECPA's "business use" exception).
107. Seeid. at714.
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Restuccia and LoRoe had a reasonable expectation of privacy for their
e-mail messages.' 8 The court also found that there was a material ques-
tion of fact as to whether the firing of Restuccia and LoRoe, who were
at-will employees, violated the public policy of the privacy statute."O
2. Smyth v. Pillsbury Company
Smyth provides an interesting comparison to Restuccia."° Both cases
involve similar fact scenarios and similar claims by the employee.
However, Restuccia's claims survived a pre-trial motion, while Smyth's
claims did not. Smyth was an employee of the Pillsbury Company."' He
sent an e-mail from home to his supervisor concerning sales manage-
ment containing the phrase "kill the backstabbing bastards" and
"referred to the planned Holiday party [at Pillsbury] as the 'Jim Jones
Koolaid affair.,, 2 Employees at Pillsbury were informed that their e-
mail messages would remain confidential and privileged and that e-mail
messages could not be used against an employee "as grounds for termi-
nation or reprimand."". Smyth's stored e-mail was accessed by his
superiors at Pillsbury and he was terminated for "transmitting ... inap-
propriate and unprofessional comments.""' 4
Smyth was an at-will employee and brought a claim in federal dis-
trict court against Pillsbury for wrongful termination. 15 The court, in
granting a motion to dismiss the claim, found that Smyth had no cause
of action, because Pennsylvania is an at-will jurisdiction and Smyth's
claim did not fit into one of the recognized public policy exceptions to
the rule that an at-will employee may be discharged for any reason."'
Smyth argued, similar to Restuccia, that his discharge was against a
claimed public policy of the common law doctrine of invasion of pri-
vacy."7 The court found this unpersuasive as the public policy exception
was narrowly limited to three exceptions: serving on jury duty, denying
employment to a person with a prior conviction and termination for re-
porting nuclear regulatory violations."'
108. See id.
109. See id.
110. Compare Restuccia, 5 Mass L. Rptr. No. 31, at 712-14, with Smyth, 914 F. Supp.
at 98-100.
111. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98.
112. Id. at 98 n.1.
113. Id. at98.
114. Id. at 99.
115. See id. at98.
116. See id. at99.
117. See id.; Restuccia, 5 Mass L. Rptr. No. 31, at 714.
118. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 99.
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The court then continued in dicta1 9 to consider the merits of a claim
under the tort of invasion of privacy if Smyth had brought such a
claim.' While this discussion arose concerning the public policy ex-
emption to the at-will employee doctrine, the court's analysis shifted to
focus on the merits of a claim by Smyth for invasion of privacy. 2'
Smyth argued that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy based
upon the prior Pennsylvania case of Borse v. Piece Goods Shop.'2 Borse
involved an employee's claim that termination for refusal to take a uri-
nalysis test was an invasion of privacy, violated public policy and
constituted an exception to the at-will doctrine.'2 The court in Smyth
compared the situation of a urinalysis test to that of Smyth's e-mail and
found that Smyth, despite Pillsbury's statements to the contrary, did not
have an expectation of privacy in his e-mail communications and even
if he did, that expectation was lost once he sent the e-mail messages
over the company's system. 4 The court also found that a reasonable
person would not consider Pillsbury's interception of the e-mail mes-
sages a highly offensive invasion of privacy."'
3. California State Cases
There have been several California cases to address the issue of
workplace e-mail monitoring. 6 These cases, all unpublished, presented
similar fact patterns and were based upon similar causes of action. Al-
though unreported, these cases have been extensively analyzed.'27 These
119. See Kent Greenawalt, Reflections on Holding and Dictum, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 431
(1989).
120. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 100-01.
121. See id.
122. See id. at 100 (citing Borse v. Piece Goods Shop, Inc., 963 F.2d 611 (3d Cir.
1992)).
123. Borse, 963 F.2d at 613. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in a lengthy analysis
of the Pennsylvania at-will employment doctrine, predicted that the state supreme court
would find that termination for a refusal to submit to a urinalysis would violate public policy
and be an exception to the at-will employment doctrine. However, the court was unclear
whether Borse had properly stated such a claim, so they vacated the district court's order
dismissing the complaint and remanded the case with instructions for Borse to amend her
complaint. Id. at 626.
124. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101.
125. See id.
126. Bourke v. Nissan Motor, Co., No. YC 003979 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Feb 1, 1991)
(a copy of the appellate decision of July 26, 1993 can be found online at
<http:wwv.law.seattleu.edu/chonm/Cases/bourke.html.> (visited Apr. 13, 1998); the appel-
late court affirmed the trial court's decision); Flanagan v. Epson America, Inc., No. BC
007036 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed July 31, 1990); Shoars v. Epson, America, Inc., No. SWC
112749 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed Mar. 26, 1990).
127. See, e.g., Rochelle B. Ecker, Comment, To Catch a Thief: The Private Employer's
Guide to Getting and Keeping an Honest Employee, 63 UMKC L. REv. 251, 269-70
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cases are also significant, because they provide further illustrations of
how plaintiffs have framed their causes of actions, again underscoring
the problem of e-mail privacy and the gray areas of the ECPA. These
cases were brought in California state courts, which are known for their
innovative approaches to the law.'2 In addition, unlike other states or
the federal Constitution, California also has a state constitutional provi-
sion which "establishes privacy as a fundamental right of citizens in this
state."'
29
a. Shoars v. Epson, Inc. and Flanagan v. Epson, Inc.
Shoars and Flanagan arose out of the same set of facts.'30 Shoars
was an Office Systems Programmer Analyst in the Information Re-
sources Department at Epson America, Inc..' In 1990, she discovered
that her direct supervisor had "systematically printed up and read all of
the E-mail that was entering and leaving Epson's place of business
.... ,,"132 Shoars "had been informing Epson employees that their e-mail
transmissions were confidential. She also believed that no one in Epson
had given her supervisor consent to read the transmissions.' 33 Shoars
requested a private e-mail account number from Epson's main systems
administrator, which her supervisor could not access, a request which
her supervisor intercepted. Her supervisor then terminated her for in-
subordination.
Shoars brought a claim under California Penal Code § 631, a wire-
tap law similar to the ECPA, claiming that Epson had violated her right
to privacy in the workplace with a wiretap.34 Shoars' claim was dis-
(discussing Shoars v. Epson America, Inc.); Lee, supra note 88, at 142 (discussing Shoars v.
Epson America, Inc.); Gantt, supra note 53, at 359-60 (discussing Flanagan v. Epson
America, Inc.); Winters, supra note 21, at 221-31 (discussing Shoars v. Epson America,
Inc.); Morris, supra note 42, at 341-343 (discussing Flanagan v. Epson America, Inc.,
Shoars v. Epson America, Inc., and Bourke v. Nissan Motor Co.); and White, supra note 53,
at 1096-97 (discussing Flanagan v. Epson America, Inc., Shoars v. Epson America, Inc., and
Bourke v. Nissan Motor Co.).
128. See Julia Turner Baumhart, The Employer's Right to Read Employee E-mail: Pro-
tecting Property or Personal Prying?, 8 LAB. LAW. 923, 944 (1992); see also Victoria Slind-
Flor, What Is E-mail, Exactly?, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 25, 1991, at 3.
129. In the case of Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Association, the California Su-
preme Court stated that this right extends to private-sector employees. ill v. National
Collegiate Athletic Association, 865 P.2d 633, 641 (Cal. 1994); see also Barker, supra note
20, at 1143; Baumhart, supra note 128, at 944.
130. See Morris, supra note 42, at 341.
131. See Winters, supra note 21, at 223.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 224; see also, Charles Piller, Bosses with X-Ray Eyes, MACWORLD, July
1993, at 122, "[Shoars's] attorney, Noel Shipman, Claims that by reading employee E-mail
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missed. One commentator examining the case, summarized the court's
reasoning for finding that there was no violation of the California state
statute stating:
First, the court concluded that it was not clear plaintiff [Shoars]
had an expectation of privacy. Without such an expectation,
there could be no invasion of that privacy through wiretapping.
The superior court did not elaborate on this statement .... Sec-
ond, the court assumed, and found arguendo, that even if
plaintiff had an expectation of privacy, E-mail was not covered
by section 631 .... Third, the court in Shoars held that section
631 did not cover interception of E-mail communications de-
spite the broad statement of intent offered by the California
legislature in section 630 of the California Penal Code.
3 1
This commentator went on to note that the superior court in Shoars
referred to the ECPA for their interpretation of § 631, and following the
statements of another commentator on the purpose of the ECPA con-
cluded that:
"under 2701 [of the ECPA], although it may be illegal for others
to gain access without authorization or to exceed authorized ac-
cess to a system [under the ECPA], 'the person or entity
providing a wire or electronic communications service' is not
liable for any offenses regarding stored communications, i.e.,
voice mail, E-mail, or other recorded communications.' 36
In other words, there simply is no ECPA violation if" 'the person or
entity providing a wire or electronic communications service' intention-
ally examines everything on the [electronic mail] system."137
Flanagan was a class action brought by the employees whose e-
mail had been read by Shoars's supervisor.3 1 The Flanagan case was
brought under the same claims as Shoars's action.'39 Likewise, the case
was dismissed by the court. "The Flanagan court refused to extend
California's right to privacy to employee E-mail, suggesting that such a
determination should be left to the legislature."' '
messages, Epson violated both the state constitution's privacy provision as well as a Califor-
nia eavesdropping statute."
135. See Winters, supra note 21, at 226-27.
136. Id. at 227 (citing Hemandez, supra note 61, at 39).
137. Winters, supra note 21, at 227.
138. See Morris, supra note 42, at 341; Gantt, supra note 53, at 397.
139. See Morris, supra note 42, at 341.
140. White, supra note 53, at 1097; see also Morris, supra note 42, at 341-42.
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b. Bourke v. Nissan Motor Corp.
Another employee e-mail monitoring case arose when Nissan Mo-
tors Corporation reviewed the e-mail communications of two Nissan
employees, Bourke and Hall, who were Information Systems Specialists
for Nissan Motors. 14' As the appellate court stated, "[p]laintiffs were
essentially customer service representatives for users of the computer
system.' 42 Bourke fnd Hall were involved in an e-mail demonstration
where some of their e-mail messages were used to demonstrate the e-
mail system at which time another Nissan employee read their mes-
sages, reporting their content to a supervisor. 14 The messages were "'of
a personal, sexual, nature and not business related.' ,144
Bourke and Hall brought an action against Nissan based on Nissan's
violation of California's constitutional right to privacy, Nissan's viola-
tion of the California wiretap statute, specifically §§ 631 and 632, and
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. 45 The appellate court
affirmed the trial court's order of summary judgment for Nissan. 4 6 In so
doing, the appellate court concluded that there was no constitutional
violation, because the plaintiffs knew that their e-mail could be read.
They had signed a Nissan company agreement stating that their e-mail
use was to be for business use only.'47 The plaintiffs also had no expec-
tation of privacy, because other employees had previously told them
that the company reviewed employee e-mail. 48 Bourke and Hall argued
that they had an expectation of privacy, because they used a password to
access their messages. 49 The court stated that the password issue might
raise a question of fact, but "the question presented to us is whether
their expectations of privacy were objectively reasonable as a matter of
law."150
On the issue of §§ 631 and 632, the facts of Bourke differed from
those of Shoars and Flanagan, because in Bourke, the e-mail messages
had not been "intercepted" but clearly accessed from storage. In Bourke,
there was less of an issue about an "interception," because the facts
make it clear that the communications were not intercepted but ac-
141. Bourke v. Nissan Motor Co., No. B068705, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. July 26, 1993)
(visited Apr. 13, 1998) <http://www.law.seattleu.edu/chonm/Cases/bourke.html>.
142. Id.
143. See id.
144. Id.
145. See id. at *3-4.
146. See id. at *1.
147. See id. at *3.
148. See id.
149. See id.
150. Id. at *3.
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cessed, and §§ 631 and 632 clearly state their prohibition is against in-
terception. 5' Because there was no invasion of privacy by Nissan in
reading the e-mail messages, the court found that there could be no dis-
charge in violation of public policy exception applied to the termination
of Bourke and Hall, who were at-will employees.' 5
IV. SOLUTIONS
A. Common Law Tort Claims
Restuccia v. Burk is the only workplace e-mail case to have sur-
vived a pre-trial attack of the e-mail user's claims. This case was
brought pursuant to Massachusetts statutory law, part of which is a codi-
fication of the common law tort of invasion of privacy.'53 Restuccia's
survival was due to the type of claims upon which the case was brought,
as compared to Smyth, and the way in which the trial court interpreted
the application of the elements for the invasion of privacy claim under
Massachusetts law. Restuccia shows that an e-mail user can raise a suc-
cessful claim to e-mail monitoring. While the strength of the claim will
be dependent upon the facts of the case, Restuccia demonstrates that
raising a triable claim is possible, i.e., the invasion of privacy tort is the
e-mail user's most likely avenue for successful redress.'
54
To prevail under the invasion of privacy tort, the e-mail user must
show that a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, that this expecta-
tion was reasonably held, and that the operator of the e-mail system did
not have a legitimate purpose for the intrusion. 55 Being able to prove
these facts may not be possible in all cases. Smyth and Shoars are ex-
amples of cases not surviving pre-trial attack.'56 The court in Smyth
stated that Smyth did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy nor
would a reasonable person "consider the defendant's interception of
these communications to be a substantial and highly offensive invasion
of his privacy."'57 In Shoars, the court just assumed that none of the
151. See id. at *4.
152. See id.
153. Compare Restuccia, 5 Mass L. Rptr. No. 31, at 714, with RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652B (1977); see discussion supra Part I.B.2.
154. "For the typical private sector employee, the only general source of legal protec-
tion for unjustified employer intrusion is the common law." Pauline T. Kim, Privacy Rights,
Public Policy, and the Employment Relationship, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 671, 675 (1996).
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
156. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98; Winters, supra note 21, at 226.
157. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101.
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system's users had a reasonable expectation of privacy, but did not pro-
vide any justification for this assumption.'
The court's reasoning in Smyth is suspect for two reasons. First the
court notes, at the beginning of the decision, that Pillsbury had
"repeatedly assured its employees, including [Smyth], that all e-mail
communications would remain confidential and privileged," and also
"that e-mail communications could not be intercepted and used by
[Pillsbury] against its employees as grounds for termination or repri-
mand."' 59 The court rationalized, that despite these statements by
Pillsbury, Smyth should still not have had any expectation of privacy.' 6
The court suggests this is because the e-mail system was "apparently
utilized by the entire company."'16 The suggestion is that because the
entire company uses the e-mail system, Smyth could not have thought
that -his communications would be confidential, or, as the company pol-
icy also stated, privileged.' 62 Black's Law Dictionary defines
confidential as "intended to be held in confidence or kept secret," and
privileged as "possessing or enjoying a privileged."' 63 Pillsbury's policy
clearly states to the user of the e-mail system that the company will not
intercept the user's e-mail164
Additionally, the company policy stated that e-mail will not be the
basis for a user's termination.'6 The court viewed Pillsbury's right to
know about Smyth's statements as outweighing any interest Smyth
had.' 66 Again, the court did not pay attention to the company's policy
and what they had told Smyth, but placed greater reliance upon their
own view of how the interests should be balanced. As one commentator
has noted, "courts have been reluctant to protect employee's privacy
interests because their interests often clash with the employer's interest
in monitoring and efficiently managing the work force."' 67
The second factor that the court does not account for is that most
people believe that their e-mail communications are protected in some
way from the view of other people. 6 Despite numerous sources that say
158. See Winters, supra note 21, at 226.
159. Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98.
160. See id. at 101
161. Id.
162. See id.
163. BLACK's LAw DICrIONARY 297, 1198 (6th ed. 1990).
164. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 98.
165. See id.
166. See id. at 101.
167. Gantt, supra note 53, at 403-04.
168. "Employees ... tend to assume that their E-mail files have the same degree of pri-
vacy as perhaps their desks, their briefcases, or their purses. When an issue arises over
management accessing someone's E-mail files, the employee is the one who feels violated."
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e-mail is like a postcard and one should not transmit anything via e-mail
that one would not want read aloud to a group, people constantly send
all sorts of personal messages over company e-mail systems. 69 This
shows that people in fact have an expectation that their e-mail commu-
nications are private and that most would find it "highly offensive" to
have their communications read by someone other than an intended re-
cipient.' 7 The court in deciding Smyth, was not considering the way e-
mail is used on a daily basis.' Had Smyth filed a claim based upon an
invasion of privacy and not wrongful termination he may have been
more successful.' 72 Also, perhaps if the Smyth case had been tried in a
Pennsylvania state court, Smyth might have had a better outcome in a
court in a position to make precedent setting state law.
73
In spite of Smyth and the California cases, and as demonstrated by
Restuccia, the common law invasion of privacy tort is the only available
basis for persons seeking redress for unwarranted monitoring of e-mail.' 74
As of yet, the ECPA remains largely untested as a remedy for e-mail users
to base a claim for improper access to a stored communication. The
Stop Agonizing-Implement an E-mail Privacy Policy, ELECTRONIC MESSAGING NEWS, Nov.
24, 1993; see Soden, supra note 4, at 1.
169. "Many employees consider e-mail a modem day water cooler for gossip and dis-
cussion." Richard J. Loftus et al., Cutting Edge Tech Can be Double-edged Sword, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 3, 1997, at Bll.
170. Alan Westin in his recent examination of privacy in the workplace concluded that
most people do not object to an employer using electronic monitoring when the employee is
communicating directly with customers or for some direct business purpose. However, out-
side of this narrow area of monitoring he states, "[w]hen some pollsters have asked the
public whether it is all right for employers to 'listen-in on the telephone calls of their em-
ployees,' the reactions are thoroughly predictable-the public says no." Alan F. Westin,
Privacy in the Workplace: How Well Does American Law Reflect American Values?, 72
CHi.-KENT L. REv. 271, 278 (1996). "One recent, national public-opinion survey found that
eighty-one percent of Americans think employers lack the right to monitor personal tele-
phone calls ..... King supra note 57, at 441-42. "Under most circumstances, employees
have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding the contents of their desks, interoffice
memos, telephone conversations, and electronic and voice mail messages." Bob Lewis, IS
Survival Guide: The Feds are Going too Far with Security; You are Violating Privacy?,
INFOWORLD, Oct. 14, 1996, at 64.
171. See, Mary Curtis, A Love-Hate-Relationship: Surf Warning Your Employer Has a
Legal Right to Monitor Your Computer Activity at the Office, L.A. Tmms, January 19, 1998.
172. But see Garr, supra note 56, at 12 (the commentator suggests that the main prob-
lem with Smyth's case was the appalling and highly offensive nature of his statements in the
e-mail communications).
173. Federal courts do not have the ability to establish state law precedent, see, e.g.,
Lehman, supra note 55, at 111.
174. "Because state statutes and constitutions determine the common law right to pri-
vacy, there are no real standards or guidelines that employers and employees can use when
determining the legal limits of their rights. There is, however, still a remedy to the wrong."
Lois R. Witt, Terminally Nosy: Are Employers Free to Access Our Electronic Mail?, 96
DICK. L. REv. 545,569 (1992).
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ECPA cases that have emerged, Bohach and Andersen, have established
that courts are likely to read § 2701(c)'s exception broadly to allow a
firm that provides e-mail service to have unlimited access to communi-
cations stored on the server.1 7 ' However, the ECPA is still untested on
this issue and a different court could provide a different interpretation to
§ 2701(c)(1).176 Restuccia and the California cases also show that state
courts may be unwilling to extend state statutes similar to the ECPA to
e-mail users' claims without some additional legislative clarification on
the scope of the statute. 7 7 The invasion of privacy claim of Restuccia is
the only claim for which a court has suggested that e-mail users have a
protected privacy interest in their workplace e-mail communications.
B. Limiting Workplace E-Mail Privacy
Users have some type of a privacy interest in their e-mail communi-
cations. However, most companies providing e-mail services in
conjunction with a user's employment will also state that this right is
severely limited by the legitimate business interests of the firm to
monitor the e-mail system to ensure that it is used for business purposes
and will not cause the firm liability. 78 These firms point to the several
grounds on which such liability could develop: e-mail use has been the
basis of several recent discrimination and harassment suits by employ-
ees or former employees because of messages sent on a firm's e-mail
system;179 e-mail messages provide users with heightened capabilities to
misappropriate trade secrets;80 e-mailed information may cause a loss of
trademark protection; 8 ' and e-mail messages may be introduced as evi-
175. "[Ihe City, as the system provider, was free to access the stored messages as it
pleased." Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1237; see also Thomas R. Greenberg, E-Mail and Voice
Mail: Employee Privacy and the Federal Wiretap Statute, 44 A. U. L. Rnv. 219, 249
(1994).
176. See Garr, supra note 56, at 12; Gantt, supra note 53, at 373-74; Susan Ellen Bin-
dler, Peek and Spy: A Proposal for -Federal Regulation of Electronic Monitoring in the
Workplace, 70 WAsH. U. L.Q. 853, 871 (1992).
177. See Restuccia, 5 Mass L. Rptr. No. 31, at 713; Winters, supra note 21, at 227.
178. See Soden, supra note 4, at 1.
179. See, e.g., Owens, 1997 WL 793004, at *1 (employment discrimination claim by an
employee stemming from racist e-mail messages.); Donley, 1992 WL 678509, at *1
(wrongful termination suit brought by an employee for sending an inappropriate e-mail mes-
sage about a client).
180. "Take the example of the company that had employees who used company e-mail
for six months to start their own competing company. They encrypted e-mail messages when
they were specifically discussing stealing company property .... [t]he company couldn't
decrypt the messages. The employees got caught because... [an] investigative company
found a Microsoft PowerPoint presentation about their new company in the system." Emily
Leinfuss, Policy Over Policing: It's Easy to Develop E-mail and Internet Policies, but Edu-
cation and Documentation are Crucial to Their Success, INFOWORLD, Aug. 19, 1996, at 56.
181. See Araneo, supra note 12, at 343.
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dence in litigation and may be discoverable on a firm's server or in
back-up tapes.'82 These possibilities provide the firm with the justifica-
tion that e-mail users' privacy interests are limited by these more
important concerns for the firm."'
1. Policies Created by Businesses
The solution that most commentators and business people have pro-
vided for the resolution of e-mail monitoring is for firms with e-mail
systems to self-regulate by establishing and creating internal policies for
users of the firm's e-mail system. The rationale for the creation of such
policies is several fold. First, the creation of a policy puts users of the
system on notice that the firm is going to monitor the e-mail system.
Once such notice is given, a user of the system is consenting to the
firm's monitoring of the system. Second, the policy provides users with
a clear understanding of the firm's expectation of how the e-mail system
can be used and what types of messages are appropriately sent on the
firm's e-mail system. The policy also tells users that " '[t]he system is in
place to facilitate the employees doing their job.' ,84 One commentator
has noted that "[a]n E-mail policy will help prevent abuse or misuse of
the E-mail system, clarify privacy expectations, reduce tensions about
privacy invasion, and help to avert possible legal action."' ' Another has
noted that the purpose of internal e-mail monitoring policies is to
"provide notice to the employees of exactly what rights are granted to
them and those that remain vested in the employer. This in turn, clearly
informs the employees as to what type of environment they are in, and
how to act accordingly."'86
2. Model Policies
The literature is replete with examples of the exact wording of such
policies and proposed model policies."8 One such example of an e-mail
policy includes the following suggested provisions:
182. See Olmstead, supra note 9, at 523.
183. Additionally, one commentator states that "traditional" tort claims in the context
of new workplace technologies, using the new term "techno-torts" to describe such actions,
are more complex and difficult for businesses to successfully litigate. See Martin C. Loesch,
Recent Developments in Self-Insurance and Risk Management, 32 TORT & INs. L.J. 583, 585
(1997).
184. Soden, supra note 4, at 19.
185. WILLIAi S. HuHBARTT, THE NEW BATTLE OVER WORKPLACE PRIVACY 144
(1998).
186. Araneo, supra note 12, at 357.
187. For an extensive list of elements to consider when proposing policies see id. at
362-64.
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(a) that the e-mail system should be used for business purposes
only; (b) that e-mail messages are automatically stored on the
computer's back-up system; and, (c) that all e-mail messages
are subject to review by the Company's management from time
to time or at any time at management's discretion.'88
Other "model" e-mail policies are more detailed, such as the Elec-
tronic Messaging Association's book, Access to and Use and Disclosure
of Electronic Mail on Company Computer Systems: A Tool Kit for
Formulating Your Company's Policy."9 This "Privacy Tool Kit" pro-
vides several checklists and questions to help companies in formulating
a policy."9 The book also provides four draft policies, each of which
takes a different approach to the limits and scope of access to workplace
e-mail. 9' The policies are organized in a continuum from least protec-
tive of employee rights to most.'92 The first draft policy is entitled "No
Restraint on Access or Disclosure" which in part states that: "All mes-
sages are company records. The company reserves the right to access
and disclose all messages sent over its electronic mail system for any
purpose."'93 The least restrictive policy is the "Policy Establishing
Bright Line Rules Preventing Particular Types of Access and Disclosure
and Requiring Notice and/or Approval by Employees," which states in
part that: "The company provides electronic mail to employees, at com-
pany expense, for their use on company business and incidentally for
personal purposes."'94
Some corporations have policies of the "No Restraint of Access or
Disclosure" type, some have policies of the more permissive type, and
still others have no policy regarding access to firm e-mail messages.'95
Due to the current state of the law, firms are at liberty to choose which
policy to adopt and how to enforce such a policy. As far as the ECPA is
concerned, as interpreted by courts in Bohach and Andersen, so long as
the firm is an e-mail provider, the user's firm e-mail can be accessed.'96
188. C. Forbes Sargent, Electronic Media and the Workplace: Confidentiality, Privacy
and Other Issues, BOSTON BAR JOURNAL, May/June 1997, at 6, 20.
189. DAVID R. JOHNSON ET AL., ACCESS TO AND USE AND DISCLOSURE OF ELECTRONIC
MAIL ON COMPANY SYsTEMS: A TOOL KIT FOR FORMULATING YOUR COMPANY'S POLICY
(1994)
190. See id. at 3-29.
191. See id. at 31-38.
192. See id.
193. Id. at31.
194. Id. at 37.
195. See Pallasch, supra note 1, at 4.
196. See Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236; Andersen, 991 F, Supp. at 1043; see also dis-
cussion supra Part II.A.
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C. Protecting Workplace E-Mail Privacy
Should people have protections for their e-mail communications in
the workplace? Most employers answer this question as maybe or no.
97
Outside of the employee/employer paradigm, looking at this issue from
the standpoint of all people in a workplace environment using e-mail,
what type of user privacy interest protection should be given to e-mail?
In today's society, where people spend many hours a day at work and
the lines of distinction are blurred between when a person is at work and
at home,"'s people need to have some type of privacy protections in the
workplace to protect against other people in the workplace accessing
their private e-mail communications.
The workplace is a community. The modem conception of the inva-
sion of privacy tort is that it not only provides people with a remedy for
violations of an interest but also allows people to define boundaries and
to define what type of conduct can take place within those boundaries.
This applies equally to "employees" and "employers." As Post has
stated about the tort of intrusion: "It rests on the premise that the integ-
rity of individual personality is dependent upon the observance of
certain kinds of social norms."'" Some businesses even recognize that
personal e-mail communications in the workplace have become a social
norm, "'the workplace is an environment of mutual trust and respect,'
said Michael Kaminsky, an administrator in G.M.'s systems department
[commenting on General Motor's "hand's off' e-mail policy]."2' The
current approach that should be taken is to view workplace e-mail as
something that should be protected and something that needs to be pro-
tected for all users.
197. "[Elmployers often believe that workers have no privacy rights on the company
online system ... ." LANCE ROSE, NETLAW: YouR RIGHTS IN THE ONLINE WORLD 179
(1995).
198. The clearest example of this blurring between the home and the office is for peo-
ple who "telecommute" or work at home during part of a work week. These people do not
just take some work home on occasion but do substantive amounts of work from their home,
which causes there to be less of a distinction between being "at work" and "at home." "[mhe
lines between personal and business time have blurred. Personal business happens in the
daytime. Employees take work home and don't charge the company for the use of their per-
sonal desks and telephones. If the company asks for the latter, it shouldn't complain about
the former." Lewis, supra note 170.
199. Post, supra note 13, at 962.
200. See Pallasch, supra note I, at 4. "[UPS and Baxter Healthcare Corp.] say they
never read messages routinely. In fact, UPS says it has only read an employee's messages
once, when an employee was suspected of accessing and reading other employees' E-mail.
By monitoring messages, UPS proved its case." Linda Wilson, Addressing E-Mail Rights,
INFORMATION WEEK, Feb. 15, 1993.
1998-1999]
208 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 5:177
1. Policies Created by Businesses
Firms and commentators point to policies created by the firm as the
way to go. These policies would generally inform the employee that the
firm owns the e-mail system, the e-mail system is only to be used for
work, and there is no expectation of privacy for e-mail messages on the
firm's system. 1 The majority view is that these policies will indemnify
the firm from any liability resulting from the e-mail user's messages or
liability from accessing the user's messages.20 The rationale being that
even if the current interpretation of the ECPA's § 2701 exceptions
change, a firm will still be protected from liability toward a user be-
cause the firm's e-mail policy has put a user on notice that their
messages are monitored and that the user's continued use of the e-mail
system is an acceptance of this policy. With these policies in place, the
firm will be able to monitor employee e-mail and the e-mail using em-
ployees will conform their actions to the realities of e-mail message
monitoring.'
The anecdotal evidence suggests that users are not limiting their e-
mail communications in the workplace. E-mail users, while becoming
more informed about the technology of e-mail and its accessibility by
others, despite password only access to systems, continue to send mes-
sages and information via e-mail that they view as being private.
Because of the features of e-mail communication, such as speed, ease of
use, lack of geographic and temporal limitations, and prevalence in
modem communications, users' perceptions of privacy will not easily
be changed, regardless of firm policy.' In this way, the telephone pro-
vides a similar example, because it continues to be used on a daily basis
to make and receive personal phone calls at the office.
E-mail users' expectations about the privacy of their e-mail com-
munications may be difficult to change and should not be changed. In
201. "Many companies sanctimoniously proclaim that because [e-mail and Internet ac-
cess are] corporate resources, employees have no right to use them for personal business and
should harbor no expectation of privacy. Well, yes, they are corporate resources. So are
desks and interoffice mail. Does this mean employees should expect their supervisors to
search through both whenever they feel like it?" Lewis, supra note 170.
202. "[E]mployers who wish to obtain the most effective protection against employee
E-mail privacy claims should publish an E-mail policy that defines the company's rights to
review employee E-mail messages." Baumhart, supra note 128, at 947.
203. "Informing employees of potential privacy intrusions, however, will not substan-
tially alleviate the extent of unwanted workplace privacy intrusions because most employees
do not bargain over working conditions in their employment positions." Gantt, supra note
53, at 407.
204. "Under a policy prohibiting personal E-mail communications, employees will un-
doubtedly experience the resentment and dehumanization that monitored employees often
experience on the job." Id. at 406; see also Marx, supra note 18, at 67.
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today's world, where people are expected to do work at home or have
established an arrangement to do most of their work from home, which
is the direct result of technology such as e-mail, affording all people a
workplace privacy interest in e-mail communications only enhances the
ability of all people to perform their work. The old view that individual
privacy is protected at home, but not afforded the same level of protec-
tion in the workplace does not work where the distinction between
"work" and "home" is blurred or does not exist at all. This idea of a
double standard of privacy does not work because users cannot distin-
guish among "the obligations owed by members of a community to each
other,"2 ' with the result that people will be less inclined to use the very
technology, e-mail, that has become so important to work. Individual
firm policies that do not recognize the e-mail users' privacy interest
only perpetuate the double standard of privacy and do nothing to define
the workplace community other than to mandate unyielding firm do-
minion over e-mail systems and users' communications.
The varying policies established by individual firms also provide e-
mail users with a confusing set of policies and in some cases tell the
users that they have no privacy interest, when the users view themselves
as having such. In some cases the policies may be misapplied. Smyth is
such an example."' Pillsbury told Smyth and his fellow e-mail users that
their communications, via e-mail, would be confidential and privileged
and would not be used as the basis for termination;27 however, then the
company acted contrary to its policies."' The company accessed his e-
mail communications and used them as the basis for his termination.O
Flanagan and Shoars provide an even clearer example of the down-
sides of placing a total reliance on policies created by a firm. There, a
supervisor decided to monitor everyone's e-mail communications, and
when he was discovered, fired the person who caught him, Shoars. The
other employees, one of them, Flanagan, whose e-mail communications
had been read, also had no legal recourse against Epson. In these cases,
the policies of the companies did not afford any privacy protection to
the e-mail users. There is yet to be a case where firm policies have not
provided liability protection to a firm, but this could happen.210
205. Post, supra note 13, at 1008.
206. See Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101.
207. See id. at 98.
208. See id.
209. See id.
210. "It appears that for at least today, employers have the greater rights when it comes
to monitoring conduct in the workplace. We live in a litigious society, and it is always possi-
ble that the wrong facts will hit a judge or member of congress, changing managerial rights
once again. It cannot be too strongly stated that common sense should be used in deciding
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In Restuccia, the users of the e-mail system were employees."z '
Restuccia would not have been a different case if they had been partners
of Burk in the firm. He could have accessed their e-mail communica-
tions, because they disagreed with him about some business decision
and would have discovered the same material. If Burk Technology had
instituted an e-mail policy, this would not have changed the outcome of
the case, so that Restuccia and LoRoe would not have a basis to state a
claim against Burk. While policies may clarify how the firm views per-
sonal e-mail messages, these policies do not resolve the problem.2 z
Additionally, firm policies do not solve the problem of communica-
tions coming into the firm. At firm X, their policy states that users' e-
mail messages are protected and will not be monitored, but at firm Y,
their policy states that the firm reviews all e-mail messages on the
firm's server. It would then be possible that a user at firm Y who re-
ceives a personal message, that has passed through firm Y's server and
been saved, from a user at firm X, could be fired for the receipt of a per-
sonal message from his friend at X.
If each firm is allowed to create their own policy this means that in-
dividual firms can do whatever they want and the user of the system has
only the amount of privacy protection afforded to them under the firm's
policy. This approach is inconsistent with privacy notions, even those
lesser ones that have been established in the workplace.2 3 In Vernars v.
Young, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals stated that private individu-
als, in their place of work, "have a reasonable expectation that their
personal mail will not be opened and read by unauthorized persons. ' '21 4
Advocates for individual firm policies stress that the e-mail system
is a new and potentially powerful way for users to commit torts and
how to use technology for workplace monitoring. Experience shows that the greatest law in
your favor is not going to persuade a jury when your facts are objectionable." Julienne W.
Bramesco, Employee Privacy: Avoiding Liability in the Electronic Age, 562 PLI/LiT 515,
529 (1997).
211. See Restuccia, 5 Mass L. Rptr. No. 31, at 712.
212. "Some commentators might respond that explicit monitoring policies will mini-
mize problems with privacy concerns because the policies synchronize the E-mail privacy
expectations among employers and employees. Armed by their awareness of the scope of
possible privacy intrusions in the workplace, employees will quantify the value of privacy in
the workplace and bargain for employment that best maximizes their income potential and
minimizes the workplace intrusions into privacy interests they value." Gantt, supra note 53,
at 406-07.
213. "The moral right to privacy ... can play a vital role in the private sector employ-
ment context. A moral right to privacy is grounded in ethics, particularly the ethical principle
that each person posses dignity and respect and must be treated as a worthwhile end and not
as a mere means. Such a moral right can serve as a challenge to employer actions that are
perceived as invasive, unreasonable or demeaning, but not legally tortious by privacy prece-
dent." Cavico, supra note 22, at 1345-46.
214. Vemars v. Young, 539 F.2d 966, 969 (3d Cir. 1976)
Workplace E-Mail: The New Privacy Frontier
other types of wrongs such as the misappropriation of trade secrets.
These policies created by firms do not really address these issues.
2
'
1
Employees harassing other employees is not a new issue in the work-
place and a body of law has been developed to address this issue,
including the passage of federal laws."6 The misappropriation of trade
secrets is also not a new issue to the workplace and a body of law has
also been developed to address this issue.2 7 Because of this, these work-
place policies seem substantively to do nothing more than strengthen the
notion that e-mail is a new medium which firms singularly control."8
The law as it currently exists does nothing to clarify the e-mail user's
privacy interest.
2. New Federal Legislation
The best solution to the problem of workplace e-mail privacy is to
enact a new federal statute. Most firms will not be receptive to onerous
federal regulation of this area. However, federal regulation is not un-
heard of in the context of workplace activities. 2" The need for federal
regulation in the area of workplace e-mail has already been raised in
Congress. One of the stated purposes of the ECPA was to address the
issue of the monitoring of new communication technologies, though the
ECPA goes only so far. The ECPA was passed in 1986, which looking
back on it, was the infancy of the use of new communications technolo-
gies. There are not many people in 1986 who could have predicted the
rapid growth and prevalence of e-mail use, especially in the workplace,
in the decade following the passage of the ECPA.
Some commentators have suggested that the ECPA needs to be re-
written to clarify the entire area of workplace communications, which
215. One commentator has stated that: "Allowing employers to limit liability for
wrongs committed against third parties using e-mail provided by the employer will encour-
age employers to develop company policies which employ only limited monitoring ......
Lehman, supra note 55, at 112.
216. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2-2000e-3 (1994) (the Act forbids workplace dis-
crimination and harassment for certain classes of people).
217. See, e.g., The Economic Espionage Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831-1839 (West
Supp. 1998).
218. "[Employer policies] compromise employee privacy interests by validating a new
avenue by which employers may monitor employees." Gantt, supra note 53, at 405.
219. Examples of federal regulation of private sector employment relationships in-
clude: The Employee Polygraph Act of 1988, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2001-2009 (1994) (the Act
generally prohibits the use of polygraph examinations for preemployment screening or dur-
ing the course of employment); The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) of 1990, 42
U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1994) (the Act prohibits discrimination against employees on the
basis of their disability and requires employees with disabilities to be accommodated in the
workplace); The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994)
(the Act imposes minimum wage and overtime standards on most employers).
1998-1999]
212 Michigan Telecommunications and Technology Law Review [Vol. 5:177
would include e-mail, telephones, voice mail and other types of modem
communications systems."" Such a measure would be very ambitious
and most likely would not occur. The ECPA was an amendment to fed-
eral wiretapping statutes and encompasses more than just workplace
communications." The prevalence of e-mail as a communications tech-
nology in the workplace suggests that it is an issue which should more
properly be addressed through legislative measures under federal labor
and employment laws, not in terms of wiretapping. Also, as the courts
have framed the issue, accessing electronically stored e-mail is not a
wiretap and does not encompass the ideas of tapping a wire or even
"intercepting" a conversation.'
The more recent legislative approach to workplace e-mail monitor-
ing, taken by the PCWA legislation, was to group e-mail monitoring
with other forms of workplace monitoring. By doing this the law must
make general conclusions about e-mail monitoring in the context of
these other very different forms of monitoring, such as identification
badge monitoring or video surveillance monitoring. Many commenta-
tors have argued that this is the proper way to frame the monitoring
issue because then federal legislation will be crafted which is broad and
can account for new forms of workplace technology which raise moni-
toring issues.' In a perfect world, this might be an optimal solution.
However, because workplace monitoring is a rather controversial issue,
it is not likely that businesses will support legislation that not only cur-
tails their current practices but also attempts to curtail and proscribe
future unknown practices.
Additionally, e-mail and the other forms of workplace monitoring
technology present very different issues. The permanence of e-mail is
not an issue present in most of the other forms of workplace monitoring.
Also, an all-encompassing federal statute may not fully address some of
the e-mail privacy issues, which could result in more of the ambiguity
that currently exists. E-mail monitoring, unlike other forms of monitor-
ing which are just accessible by a boss or upper management, is more
easily accessed by all people in a firm. One example of this is the
Shoars case, where a mid-level employee gained access to many em-
ployees' e-mail messages. Further, the PCWA legislation failed to
address how the provisions of the PCWA were going to affect or be af-
220. See Julie A. Flanagan, Note, Restricting Electronic Monitoring in the Private
Workplace, 43 DuoE L.J. 1256, 1271-80 (1994); Bindler, supra note 176, at 880-81.
221. See S. RFP. No. 99-541, at 1 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555.
222. See Bohach, 932 F. Supp. at 1236; Moriarty, 962 F. Supp. at 221.
223. See Bindler, supra note 176, at 880-81.
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fected by the ECPA. New federal legislation for e-mail monitoring must
either amend the current ECPA or indicate how it affects the ECPA.
The paramount issue which new legislation must address is to clar-
ify § 2701 of the ECPA. Section 2701, as currently written, is vague and
ambiguous, and courts have done little to clarify these ambiguities. New
federal legislation must clarify who is a provider of e-mail services and
then delineate the rights of the provider to access stored communica-
tions. This should be done by creating a completely new statute.
However, the current structure of the ECPA can be used as a model for
this. A new provision could follow the structure of the ECPA by pro-
hibiting the accessing of stored communications and providing a civil
cause of action for the violation of this prohibition, but such a new pro-
vision would provide a clear definition of what constitutes being a
provider of e-mail services. A new provision would also have various
exceptions to this broad prohibition. These exceptions, a consent and
"business use" exception, need to be clearly worded and definitive about
how they could be invoked.
The new legislation should create a specific exception which states
that users must give express consent to message monitoring. The issue
of implied consent is troublesome in the context of e-mail monitoring
because most users use passwords to access e-mail communications.
Implied consent can easily be construed to have been given when some-
one signs onto an e-mail system containing a statement in the password
program that signing onto the system constitutes consent to access mes-
sages.
The consent exception should also be limited in time and scope, so
that the user is consenting to the firm accessing only the communica-
tions that the user has expressly consented to.22 By requiring express
consent, the user will also have notice that the employer is accessing the
user's messages and the scope of this access.m Because stored e-mail
can be searched and sorted in various ways, if a firm has a need to ac-
cess a user's messages due to a suspicion of some impropriety on behalf
224. Some commentators have argued that e-mail systems are so large and contain so
many messages that firms have no incentive to monitor everyone's e-mail messages. They
might respond to an express consent provision such as this by stating that it is unnecessary
because the shear volume of the systems is a natural constraint upon firms to do large scale
monitoring of users' e-mail messages. See, e.g., PAUL M. ScHNVARTz ET AL., DATA PRIVACY
LAw 372 (Michie 1996).
225. This idea is called transparency which is one of the concepts underlying the Euro-
pean data protection principles. Professors Paul M. Schwartz and Joel R. Reidenberg, in their
book Data Privacy Law, have summarized transparency as the idea that monitoring activities
must be "structured in a manner that will be open and understandable." The two European
components to transparency are: "notice to individuals of the collection of personal informa-
tion .... [and] consent from individuals .... Id. at 15.
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of the user, the firm can obtain the user's consent and then search the
system thereby accessing only those messages that pertain to the impro-
priety while not intruding upon the user's other messages. If a user is
unwilling or unable to give this consent, the firm could still access the
communication, but the user would be given notice of this access. This
notice would state the reason for the access, the information to be ac-
cessed, and when and for how long the access would take place. These
provisions illustrate how the new legislation will allow access to a
user's e-mail messages, but in a limited and controlled manner and for a
specified purpose.
Likewise, a "business use" exception would be drafted to clarify the
definition of who is a provider and to delineate the access to be given to
a provider. Systems administrators may need to access the e-mail sys-
tem for the purpose of operating the system. However, other people at
the firm do not have a need to haite broad access to the system. Moreo-
ver, this exception should not allow broad access for the purpose of
individual message monitoring for the content of a message. If such a
need exists then it would be gained through the user's consent under the
consent exception and not under the "business use" exception.
Even with federal legislation that clarifies access in this manner,
firms would be required to adopt individual policies. However, these
policies would not be able to preempt or conflict with the proposed fed-
eral provisions. The federal provisions would establish a baseline for
what type of access may take place and then firms could adopt policies
more stringent or more protective of users' e-mail26 The federal legis-
lation would mandate that at the minimum firms must establish policies
mirroring the federal legislation.
The federal legislation would also provide a remedy to a user when
there has been access in violation of the firm's policy. For example, in
Smyth, when Pillsbury adopted the policy that e-mail communications
were confidential and privileged and could not be used as the basis for
termination, but then violated this policy, Smyth would have some re-
course under the proposed federal legislation. This recourse does not
226. In his article about privacy and health care information, Professor Paul M.
Schwartz makes a similar argument about the way in which his proposed statutory solution
would establish "a general default rule." Supporting his proposition, Professor Schwartz
cites to "the contracts jurisprudence of Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner" where they "have
argued that '[s]etting a default rule that least favors the better informed parties creates an
incentive for the informed party to bring up the relative contingency in negotiations."' Pro-
fessor Schwartz links this idea to his statutory proposal for health care data stating: "This
default rule seeks to maximize both the efficient use of information that is already collected
and the necessary negotiations between concerned parties regarding use of these data." Paul
M. Schwartz, Privacy and the Economics of Personal Health Care Information, 76 TEx. L.
REv. 1, 59 (1997).
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have to be the granting of a cause of action. That could be one option,
but it should include some way for a user to redress an access violation.
One option would be to allow for internal administrative review or a
requirement of a mediation process. The purpose of employer policies is
to establish a framework inside the firm for the process of accessing e-
mail messages within the federal legislation's guidelines. The basis of
these policies, unlike those that currently exist, will not be for the em-
ployer to assert their uncontrolled dominion over the firm's e-mail
system or to completely absolve the firm of liability for its accessing of
e-mail messages.
The proposed federal legislation will be the base and the individual
firm policies will provide the structure. These policies will define the
"boundaries of the community" and reinforce how the community of the
firm is going to address access to e-mail communications. Even the pro-
ponents of firm self-regulation stress that policies need to define the
community of the firm in terms of access to e-mail communications.
The advantage of having both federal legislation which establishes the
basic protections in conjunction with firm policies is that the firm re-
tains the ability to gain access to e-mail messages and retains autonomy
over the firm's e-mail system. This allows users of the e-mail system to
retain their autonomy over message content, while allowing the firm to
provide employees with recognition of a privacy interest in their e-mail
communications.' At the same time, the users will have affirmative
knowledge about the type of monitoring that is permissible and possi-
ble. The user would also know that some recourse is available for
violations of the firm's policy or for violations of the federal legislation.
If a user were to send harassing messages or e-mail messages con-
taining trade secret information on the firm's system, the firm through
the user's consent could access those communications and then resolve
those issues based upon laws concerning the specific activity. The poli-
cies of the firm would apply to all users of the e-mail system and the
federal legislation would apply to all workplace e-mail. This would in-
clude intranet systems as well as Internet systems. Legislation of this
sort should be allowed under Congress' interstate commerce clause
power, because e-mail systems, including internal ones, now clearly
have an impact on interstate commerce even under the current Supreme
227. "[P]rivacy is best protected when monitoring is minimally intrusive, is directly
relevant to job performance, and is visible.... Highly intrusive forms of checking that are
not directly related to work output should be restricted to situations where there are some
grounds for suspicion." Marx, supra note 18, at 72.
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Court's more limiting interpretation of this power in light of United
States v. Lopez./
CONCLUSION
The technology of e-mail poses the new workplace privacy issue of
who should be able to access e-mail users' workplace e-mail communi-
cations. All e-mail users have a privacy interest in these
communications because being able to communicate privately in this
new medium has become a recognized social norm. Users, despite ad-
monitions to do otherwise, continue to transmit private messages and
information via e-mail. Moreover a privacy interest must also be af-
forded to e-mail communications to provide users with a sense of
community and to establish boundaries within this boundless commu-
nity.
The ECPA, as originally enacted, was supposed to provide protec-
tion against the general monitoring and interception of e-mail messages
except through limited exceptions. However, judicial interpretation has
left the Act with no protections for workplace e-mail users. Additional
federal legislation that has thus far been proposed seems destined to
further leave workplace e-mail users without any meaningful protection
of their privacy interest in workplace e-mail. In order for there to be
recognition of the workplace privacy interest in e-mail communications,
new federal legislation must be passed, which while mirroring the
ECPA, will close the large loopholes of the ECPA's consent and
"business use" exceptions.
Until federal legislation along these lines becomes law, workplace
e-mail users have the remedy of the common law invasion of torts as
their only available remedy, in some cases, against egregious intrusions
into their private communications. With the law in this state, it remains
to be seen whether e-mail use will continue to grow and become the
preferred mode of communication, as it has done since its recent intro-
duction, or whether it will wither as e-mail users revert to modes of
communication with more clearly recognized privacy interests.
228. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (finding that Congress's commerce
clause power was too attenuated in enacting the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990). Inter-
net and intranet e-mail systems have become integral to the way in which most firms transact
their daily business, so much so that just because a communication may not cross an inter-
state boundary the communications system still has an impact upon the way in which that
firm transacts its business. For a discussion about the possible application of the Commerce
Clause to the regulation of computer bulletin boards in the context of the regulation of cy-
berporn, see Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Virtual Reality and "Virtual Welters": A Note on the
Commerce Clause Implications of Regulating Cyberporn, 82 VA. L. REv. 535, 537 (1996).
